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Abstract
With deep neural networks providing state-of-the-
art machine learning models for numerous ma-
chine learning tasks, quantifying the robustness
of these models has become an important area of
research. However, most of the research literature
merely focuses on the worst-case setting where
the input of the neural network is perturbed with
noises that are constrained within an `p ball; and
several algorithms have been proposed to compute
certified lower bounds of minimum adversarial
distortion based on such worst-case analysis. In
this paper, we address these limitations and extend
the approach to a probabilistic setting where the
additive noises can follow a given distributional
characterization. We propose a novel probabilistic
framework PROVEN to PRObabilistically VErify
Neural networks with statistical guarantees – i.e.,
PROVEN certifies the probability that the classi-
fier’s top-1 prediction cannot be altered under any
constrained `p norm perturbation to a given input.
Importantly, we show that it is possible to derive
closed-form probabilistic certificates based on cur-
rent state-of-the-art neural network robustness ver-
ification frameworks. Hence, the probabilistic
certificates provided by PROVEN come naturally
and with almost no overhead when obtaining the
worst-case certified lower bounds from existing
methods such as Fast-Lin, CROWN and CNN-
Cert. Experiments on small and large MNIST and
CIFAR neural network models demonstrate our
probabilistic approach can achieve up to around
75% improvement in the robustness certification
with at least a 99.99% confidence compared with
the worst-case robustness certificate delivered by
CROWN.
Preprint.
1 Introduction
Despite the recent advances and successes of deep neural
networks in many machine learning tasks, it has been shown
that adversarial examples exist and can be easily crafted,
spanning from image classification [1] to speech recogni-
tion [2] to malware detection [3] and sparse regression [4],
just to name a few. Although deep neural networks have
achieved unprecedented performance in these applications,
their lack of robustness against adversarial perturbations
[5, 6] has raised serious concerns and has drawn a great
deal of attention by the machine learning communities, as
many safety-critical tasks cannot afford the potential risks
incurred by adversarial examples.
While there is a growing interest in crafting adversarial ex-
amples with stronger attacks under various settings (e.g.,
white-box/grey-box/black-box attacks) and in developing
effective defense strategies against adversarial attacks, the
topic of assessing and verifying robustness properties of neu-
ral networks is equally important and challenging. Given
a well-trained neural network model, we are interested in
measuring its robustness on an arbitrary natural example
x0 by examining if the neighborhood of x0 has the same
prediction results; this serves as a robustness proxy for eval-
uating the ease with which one can turn x0 into adversarial
examples via adversarial manipulations. Conventionally,
the concept of neighborhood is characterized by an `p ball
centered at x0 with radius  for any p ≥ 1, where larger 
indicates greater robustness. Ideally, for robustness evalua-
tion, we would like to find the smallest adversarial distortion
imposed on x0 that will change the model prediction, which
is known as the minimum adversarial distortion. Unfor-
tunately, it has been shown that computing the minimum
adversarial distortion on neural networks with ReLU activa-
tions is an NP-complete problem [7, 8], and hence formal
verification methods such as Reluplex [7] and Planet [9]
are computationally demanding and cannot scale to large
realistic networks.
As an alternative to minimum adversarial distortion, the
concept of solving for a (non-trivial) lower bound on min-
imum distortion as a certified robustness metric has been
recently proposed in [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] and ap-
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Table 1: Table of Notation
Notation Definition Notation Definition
K number of output classes CDF cumulative distribution function
f : Rn0 → RK neural network classifier pdf probability density function
x0 ∈ Rn0 original input vector FX CDF of a random variable X
c = argmini fi(x0) predicted class of input x0 fX pdf of a random variable X
gt(x) = fc(x)− ft(x) margin function at x for class t P[gt(X) > a] probability that gt(X) is greater than a
gLt (x) : Rn0 → R linear lower bound of gt(x) γL theoretical lower bound of P[gt(X) > a]
gUt (x) : Rn0 → R linear upper bound of gt(x) γU theoretical upper bound of P[gt(X) > a]
pears to be a promising approach. Theoretical lower bounds
have been derived in terms of local Lipschitz constants for
continuously-differentiable classifiers [10] and neural net-
works with ReLU activations [14]. In addition, there have
been some recent works on developing algorithms that are
able to deliver certified lower bounds for fully-connected
networks with ReLU activations [12, 14, 16] and general ac-
tivations [15], and for general convolutional neural networks
with commonly-used convolutional layers, pooling layers
and residual blocks [17]. Here the term certified means
that numerical values generated by these approaches are
indeed deterministic lower bounds. In other words, all such
approaches consider the setting where an input example can
be perturbed by any perturbation bounded in an `p ball, and
thus their analyses all belong to the category of worst-case
analysis.
On the other hand, additional alternative questions of inter-
est include:
(a) What are the corresponding guarantees under the situa-
tion where the input data point is perturbed with some
random noises?
(b) Can we provide confidence levels on the possibility
that a given model will never be fooled under this
probabilistic setting?
One way to address questions such as (a) and (b) is to relate
them to the sensitivity of a target model f when the noise
in the input is known to follow a given distribution. With
prior knowledge on the noise distribution, this approach is
expected to provide a more informative robustness certifi-
cation in comparison to the prevailing worst-case analysis.
More importantly, this statistical viewpoint of robustness
indeed goes beyond the worst-case analysis considered in
the adversarial attack setting. The probabilistic robustness
certification is readily applicable to understanding the sen-
sitivity and reliability of a target model subject to additive
random noises under mild assumptions. For example, such
random noises can be caused by data quantization, input
preprocessing, or environmental background noises.
Unfortunately, to date there have been relatively little re-
search efforts along these lines. Existing works [18, 19]
require some unverifiable or unrealistic assumptions on the
classifier models and decision boundaries, rendering their
results less useful in practice, especially for neural network
models. This is indeed at the core of the motivation for
our work – we seek to develop a probabilistic framework
that can address questions such as (a) and (b), without im-
posing unverifiable assumptions on the models or decision
boundaries.
In summary, we propose in this work a novel probabilistic
framework PROVEN to PRObabilistically VErify Neural
network robustness. We show that it is possible to extend
the conventional worst-case setting to a probabilistic setting
based on existing worst-case certification frameworks with
very little computational overhead, meaning that the proba-
bilistic certificate comes naturally with nearly no additional
overhead beyond worst-case robustness computations by
methods such as Fast-Lin [14], CROWN [15] and CNN-
Cert [17].
Contributions. We highlight the contributions of this pa-
per as follows.
• A probabilistic framework PROVEN is proposed for
certifying the robustness of neural networks under
`p norm-ball bounded threat models, when the input
noise follows a given distributional characterization
(zero-mean Gaussian or independent bounded random
noises). The established theoretical results are based
on an `∞ constraint on the perturbation, but can be
easily extended to other norms such as `1 and `2.
• Experimental results on large neural networks trained
on MNIST and CIFAR datasets show that the robust-
ness certification metric (i.e., the certified lower bound)
can be greatly improved under the proposed probabilis-
tic framework in comparison with the corresponding
worst-case analysis results, even when the statistical
risk is small. For example, with a confidence level
of 99.99%, which means the robustness metric is al-
most 100% guaranteed to be certified, the improve-
ment provided by our probabilistic framework over the
worst-case analysis can be as high as 78.9% for small
networks and 32.8% for large networks.
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• In addition to the noticeable improvement in the robust-
ness metric, our probabilistic framework is a general
tool that can be readily applied to neural networks
with different activation functions, including tanh, sig-
moid and arctan, as will be demonstrated in our ex-
periments. Moreover, our proposed method is as com-
putationally efficient as the worst-case analysis, since
our probabilistic certificate has a closed-form and its
parameters are by-products of worst-case certification
frameworks (e.g., Fast-Lin [14], CROWN [15], and
CNN-Cert [17]).
2 Background and related works
Given an input data example under a specified threat model,
typically `p norm-ball bounded perturbation attacks, the
goal of formal verification for adversarial robustness aims to
certify a perturbation level  such that the top-1 prediction
will not be altered by any means. In other words, formal
verification guarantees that no attack under the threat model
can alter the top-1 prediction of the model if its attack per-
turbation is smaller than . However, certifying the largest
possible , which is equivalent to finding the minimum per-
turbation required for a successful adversarial attack, has
been shown to be an NP-complete problem [7] and thus it
is computationally infeasible for large realistic networks.
Alternatively, recent studies have shown that solving for a
lower bound of the minimum perturbation for formal verifi-
cation can be made more scalable and computationally effi-
cient [12, 14, 16, 20]. Some analytical lower bounds, based
solely on model weights, have been derived [1, 21, 10, 13]
but they can be loose, even becoming trivial lower bounds
(close to 0), or they only apply to 1 or 2 hidden layers.
It is worth noting that current robustness verification ap-
proaches mainly focus on a “worst-case” analysis, whereas
our approach takes a probabilistic viewpoint for robustness
certification. As will be evident in the following sections,
our probabilistic framework approach PROVEN is able to
certify a significantly larger  value than the corresponding
worst-case analysis result with 99.99% certification guaran-
tees. This indicates that, while the conventional worst-case
robustness certification framework may be too conservative
when there is some prior knowledge about the input pertur-
bations (e.g., its distribution), our probabilistic framework
will be more applicable in this situation.
In fact, deep neural networks are not only vulnerable to
crafted adversarial noises but also to random noises: Bibi
et al. [22] show that they can fool LeNet and AlexNet with
additive Gaussian noises and Fawzi et al. [23] show random
perturbations can indeed fool VGG networks; Hosseini et
al. [24] show they fool the Google Cloud Vision API by
random Gaussian noises, suggesting random perturbation
can be used in a serious adversarial attack. Meanwhile, the
robustness of classifiers to various kinds of random noises,
such as uniform noise in the `p unit ball and Gaussian noise
with an arbitrary covariance matrix, has been studied in [18].
This can apply to linear classifiers as well as non-linear
classifiers with locally approximately flat decision bound-
aries. The bounds in the uniform `p case depend on some
universal constants, which may be arbitrarily large or small
and can impact the quality of these bounds. Recently, the
robustness of classifiers to perturbations under the assump-
tion of Gaussian distributed latent input vectors has been
studied in [19]. Moreover, all the results in [19] depend on
the modulus of continuity constant, which can be arbitrarily
large since one cannot control it. Due to these limitations,
the bounds in these recent papers cannot be directly used
to deliver certified robustness metrics. We note that our
probabilistic framework is not limited to supervised neural
network models – while this work is under review, a very
recent workshop paper [25] takes a similar approach to ver-
ify some properties (e.g., monotonicity and convexity) of
deep probabilistic models such as variational autoencoders
(VAEs) [26] and conditional VAEs. The key differences
are that in their setting the uncertainty source is the latent
variable sampled from a distribution generated by the en-
coder (they consider only Gaussian distribution), whereas
our uncertainty comes from input perturbations (we consider
Gaussian as well as general bounded distributions) and our
focus is to verify neural network classifiers in supervised
learning instead of generative models. This also indicates a
connection between probabilistic robustness certification of
neural network classifiers and property verification of deep
generative models.
3 PROVEN: a probabilistic framework to
certify neural network robustness
In this section, we present a general probabilistic framework
PROVEN together with related theoretical results to compute
the certified bounds in probability that a classifier can never
be fooled when the inputs of the classifier are perturbed with
some given distributions. We first introduce a worst-case
setting, where an input example can be perturbed by any
perturbation bounded within an `p ball, and present corre-
sponding worst-case analysis results. We then show that it is
possible to extend these worst-case analysis results to a prob-
abilistic setting where the input perturbations follow some
given distributions, and present our probabilistic framework
and main theorem. Lastly, we provide closed-form proba-
bilistic bounds for various probabilistic distributions that
the input perturbations can follow.
3.1 Worst-case setting
Let f(x) : Rn0 → RK denote a K-class neural network
classifier of interest, which takes an input x (e.g., an image)
and outputs the corresponding logit scores over all classes.
The ultimate goal is to efficiently find the largest ∗ such
that the original predicted class c always has a larger score
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fc(x) than the score ft(x) for a targeted attack class t when
the input is perturbed within the `p ball having radius ∗.
Letting gt(x) = fc(x)− ft(x), we want to find the largest
∗ such that gt(x) > 0 for all x satisfying ‖x − x0‖p ≤
∗ and c = argmaxifi(x0), t 6= c. This ∗ is a certified
lower bound of the minimum adversarial distortion as first
introduced in Section 1.
It has been shown in [14, 15, 17] that the output fi(x) and
the margin function gt(x) of a general (convolutional) neu-
ral network classifier with general activation functions (in-
cluding but not limited to ReLU, tanh, arctan, sigmoid) can
be bounded by two linear functions. In other words, the
authors show that
gLt (x) ≤ gt(x) ≤ gUt (x), (1)
where gLt (x) : Rn0 → R and gUt (x) : Rn0 → R are two
linear functions
gLt (x) = A
L
t,:x+ d
L and gUt (x) = A
U
t,:x+ d
U (2)
with ALt,:,A
U
t,: ∈ R1×n0 being two constant row vectors
and dL, dU ∈ R being two constants related to the network
weights W(k) and biases b(k) as well as the parameters
bounding the activation functions in each neuron. The su-
perscripts L and U denote the parameters corresponding to
the lower bound and the upper bound of gt(x).
As the network output is bounded, the positiveness of the
lower bound of gt(x) implies that gt(x) is positive, i.e.,
gLt (x) > 0 =⇒ gt(x) > 0. (3)
Here, a worst-case analysis can be performed by minimizing
the linear function gLt (x) over all possible inputs in the set
{x : ‖x− x0‖p ≤ }, which yields a closed-form solution
as presented in [14, 15, 17]. Therefore, the condition of
whether gLt (x) > 0 can be conveniently checked given
some  using the closed-form solutions; the largest  such
that gLt (x) > 0 is called the certified lower bound, which
can be computed by bisection with respect to .
3.2 Our proposed probabilistic framework: PROVEN
In addition to considering the worst-case condition for
gt(x) > 0 over the norm ball constrained on the input
{x : ‖x − x0‖p ≤ }, we now show that it is possible
to formulate a probabilistic setting and derive bounds with
guarantees by building upon the above results that the neural
network output can be bounded by two linear functions. We
start by presenting the problem formulation of the proba-
bilistic setting and then present our main theoretical results
in Theorem 3.1.
Problem formulation. Consider a neural network classifier
f(x) and an input example x0. Let the predicted class of
x0 be c, the targeted attack class t, and the margin func-
tion gt(x) = fc(x) − ft(x). Suppose the perturbed input
random vector X follows some given distribution D, i.e.,
X ∼ D. We are interested in the probability of the margin
function gt(x) being greater than some value a ∈ R, i.e.,
P [gt(X) > a].
Given that the neural network f(x) is highly non-linear
and non-convex in x, it is hard to directly compute the dis-
tribution of gt(X) given the input X ∼ D. Fortunately,
we can still derive analytic lower and upper bounds for
P [gt(X) > 0] with guarantees based on the result in the
worst-case analysis that the margin function gt(x) can be
bounded by two linear functions as shown in (1). The fol-
lowing theorem provides such theoretical guarantees on
P [gt(X) > 0].
Theorem 3.1 (Probabilistic bounds of network output)
Let f(x) be a K-class neural network classifier function,
x0 an input example, and  such that ‖x−x0‖p ≤ , p ≥ 1.
Let c = argmaxifi(x0), let t(6= c) be some targeted class,
and define the margin function gt(x) = fc(x) − ft(x).
Suppose the input random vector X ∈ Rn0 follows some
given distribution D with mean x0 and let a ∈ R be some
real number. There exists an explicit lower bound γL and an
explicit upper bound γU on the probability P [gt(X) > a]
such that
γL ≤ P [gt(X) > a] ≤ γU , (4)
where
γL = 1− FgLt (X)(a), γU = 1− FgUt (X)(a), (5)
FZ(z) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the
random variable Z, and gLt (x), g
U
t (x) satisfy Equation (1).
Proof. Let h1 : Rd → R, h2 : Rd → R, and h1(x) ≥
h2(x), ∀x ∈ Rd. Let X ∈ Rd be a random vector and
let Y1 ∈ R, Y2 ∈ R+ be two random variables. Since
h1(x) ≥ h2(x) always hold, we can let h1(X) = Y1 + Y2
and h2(X) = Y1 for some random value Y2 ≥ 0. We
therefore have
P[h1(X) > a] = P[Y1 + Y2 > a] = P[Y1 > a− Y2],
P[h2(X) > a] = P[Y1 > a].
Since a− Y2 ≤ a for any random value Y2 ≥ 0, we obtain
P[Y1 > a− Y2] ≥ P[Y1 > a] based on the fact that the cu-
mulative distribution function is nondecreasing [27], which
is equivalent to
P[h1(X) > a] ≥ P[h2(X) > a]. (6)
From the results in [14], we know that the relationships in
Equation (1), i.e.,
gLt (x) ≤ gt(x) ≤ gUt (x),
satisfy ‖x − x0‖p ≤  for all x. Hence, upon apply-
ing Equation (6) to Equation (1) and using the fact that
P [Z > a] = 1− FZ(a), we obtain
γL ≤ P [gt(X) > a] ≤ γU ,
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with γL = 1− FgLt (X)(a), γU = 1− FgUt (X)(a). 
As discussed in Section 3.1, the neural network output and
the margin function can be bounded by two linear functions
[14, 15, 17]. Here, we take an additional step to investi-
gate the relationship between the margin function and its
linear bounds in the probabilistic setting. Specifically, The-
orem 3.1 shows that the probability of the neural network
margin function being greater than some value a can also
be bounded by the CDFs of its linear bounds. Note that in
the worst-case analysis of Section 3.1, we usually concern
ourselves with the margin function gt(x) > 0, i.e., a = 0.
Analogously, in the probabilistic setting, we concern our-
selves with the probability of the margin function gt(x) > 0.
This is indeed the guarantee provided by Theorem 3.1: when
the input X ∼ D, the result guarantees that the probability
of gt(X) > a is at least γL and at most γU .
3.3 Evaluating the probabilistic bounds
Theorem 3.1 provides us with a theoretical lower bound
γL and upper bound γU for P [gt(X) > a]. In practice, we
would like to numerically compute such bounds. Below
we show it is possible to obtain explicit forms for γL and
γU in terms of ALt,;,A
U
t,;, d
L, dU , as well as the parameters
of the probability distributions of input perturbations. By
Theorem 3.1, γL and γU only depend on the CDFs FgLt (X)
and FgUt (X), and we observe that g
L
t (X) and g
U
t (X) are
both linear functions of X as follows:
gLt (X) =
n0∑
i=1
ALt,iXi + d
L,
gUt (X) =
n0∑
i=1
AUt,iXi + d
U .
Hence, the problem of computing the CDFs FgLt (X) and
FgUt (X) becomes a problem of computing the CDFs of a
weighted sum of Xi given X ∼ D. We primarily consider
the following two cases:
(i) When Xi are independent random variables with prob-
ability density function (pdf) fXi ;
(ii) When X follows a multivariate normal distribution
with mean x0 and covariance Σ.
It also appears that these results may be extended to address
some forms of negative correlation [28, 29].
3.3.1 Case (i)
When Xi are independent random variables with proba-
bility density function fXi , there are two approaches for
computing the CDFs of the weighted sum.
Approach 1: Direct convolutions. The pdf of the
weighted sum is simply the convolution of the pdfs for
each of the weighted random variables ALt,iXi. Specifically,
we have
fALt,:X =
n0~
i=1
fALt,iXi ,
where ~Ni=1 hi denotes convolution over the N func-
tions h1 to hN . The CDF of ALt,:X can therefore be ob-
tained from the pdf fALt,:X and we obtain FgLt (X)(z) =
FALt,:X(z − dL); similarly, FgUt (X)(z) = FAUt,:X(z − dU ).
Hence, we have
γL = 1− FALt,:X(a− dL), γU = 1− FAUt,:X(a− dU ).
Approach 2: Probabilistic inequalities. Approach 1 is
useful in cases where n0 is not large. However, for large n0,
it might not be easy to directly compute the CDF through
convolutions. For such cases, an alternative approach can
be based on applying the probabilistic inequalities on the
CDFs. Since we want to provide guarantees on the desired
probability in (4), we need to find a lower bound on γL
and an upper bound on γU via the probabilistic inequalities.
These results are given in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2 Let Xi be bounded independent random
variables with Xi ∈ [x0i − ,x0i + ],∀i ∈ [n0], and
symmetric around the mean x0i. Define
µL = A
L
t,:x0 + d
L, µU = A
U
t,:x0 + d
U .
Then, we have
γL ≥
{
1− exp
(
− (µL−a)2
22‖ALt,:‖22
)
, if µL − a ≥ 0
0, otherwise;
γU ≤
{
exp
(
− (µU−a)2
22‖AUt,:‖22
)
, if − µU + a ≥ 0
1, otherwise.
Proof. Let Wi = ALt,i(Xi − x0i) and µL = ALt,:x0 +
dL. We then have −|ALt,i| ≤ Wi ≤ |ALt,i| where Wi
is symmetric with respect to zero since Xi is symmetric.
By using the fact that the sum of independent symmetric
random variables is still a symmetric random variable [30],
we derive
γL = P
[
gLt (X) > a
]
= P
[
n0∑
i=1
Wi > a− µL
]
= P
[
n0∑
i=1
Wi < −a+ µL
]
= 1− P
[
n0∑
i=1
Wi ≥ −a+ µL
]
.
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From the Hoeffding inequality [31], we obtain the following
upper bound on the term P [
∑n0
i=1Wi ≥ −a+ µL] when
−a+ µL > 0:
P
[
n0∑
i=1
Wi ≥ −a+ µL
]
≤ exp
(
− (µL − a)
2
22‖ALt,:‖22
)
,
and thus γL ≥ 1−exp
(
− (µL−a)2
22‖ALt,:‖22
)
. When−a+µL ≤ 0,
we use the trivial bound of γL = 0. Similarly, for γU ,
we can define µU correspondingly and directly apply the
Hoeffding inequality to obtain γU ≤ exp
(
− (µU−a)2
22‖AUt,:‖22
)
, or
use the trivial bound of γU = 1. 
3.3.2 Case (ii)
When X follows a multivariate normal distribution with
mean x0 and covariance Σ, we are able to obtain an explicit
form for the CDFs FgLt (X) and FgUt (X) based on the fact
that the sum of normally distributed random variables still
follows the normal distribution [30]. Note that we include
here both cases where (a) Xi are independent Gaussian
random variables (Σ is a diagonal matrix) and (b) Xi are
correlated random variables (Σ is a general covariance ma-
trix and positive semidefinite). Our result is stated in the
following corollary.
Corollary 3.3 Let X follow a multivariate normal distribu-
tion with mean x0 and covariance Σ. Define
µL = A
L
t,:x0 + d
L, σ2L = A
L
t,:Σ(A
L
t,:)
>,
µU = A
U
t,:x0 + d
U , σ2U = A
U
t,:Σ(A
U
t,:)
>,
where > denotes the transpose operator. We then have
γL ≈ 1
2
− 1
2
erf(
a− µL
σL
√
2
), γU ≈ 1
2
− 1
2
erf(
a− µU
σU
√
2
)
with erf(·) as the error function.
Proof. The result is obtained in a straightforward manner
from the fact [30] that if X ∼ N (µ,Σ), then its linear com-
bination Z = wX + v also follows the normal distribution:
Z ∼ N (wµ+ v, wΣw>). The CDF of Z is then given by
1
2 (1 + erf(
z−µZ
σZ
√
2
)), leading to the stated approximations. 
Remark 3.4 Note that in our framework, all possible inputs
have to lie in the `p ball with given radius . Thus, in order
to apply the Gaussian perturbation in our setting, we need
to set an upper limit on the variance of the input such that
99.7% of the density is within the `p ball, i.e., the 3-σ rule.
See Section 4 Methods for more details.
Connection to `1 and `2 norms. Our foregoing prob-
abilistic analysis is established under the `∞ norm con-
straint. We note that this presented analysis can be easily
extended to `1 and `2 norms by using the norm inequalities:
‖x‖1 ≤ √n0‖x‖2 ≤ n0‖x‖∞.
4 Experiments
Methods. We apply Corollaries 3.2 and 3.3 to compute
the largest  (denoted as PROVEN) that PROVEN can certify
with confidence of at least γL when the input follows the
two cases discussed in Section 3.3. The certified lower
bound computed by the worst-case analysis in [14] and [15]
is denoted as worst-case. Below is the setting of the input
distributions in our simulations:
• Case (i). Xi are independent random variables
bounded in [x0i−worst-case,x0i+worst-case] with mean
x0i. The results are presented in Table 2.
• Case (ii). X follows a multivariate normal distribution
with mean x0 and covariance Σ. We consider both
situations where Σ is a positive diagonal matrix or
a positive semidefinite matrix with diagonals whose
square roots are less than or equal to worst-case/3. The
results are presented in Figure 1.
Note that in all the Tables, we express γL as a per-
centage. We report PROVEN for the following values:
{(100 − η), 75, 50, 25, 5, 0}% where η = 10−2 and cal-
culate the improvement of PROVEN over worst-case obtained
by (100−η)% in the last column in Table 2 for Case (i). The
results in Table 2 are averaged over 10 randomly selected
images in the test sets. On the other hand, we also investi-
gate how robust it is for the results in Table 2 by computing
the average PROVEN over randomly chosen {10, 50, 100}
images in 100 random trials. We report the mean and stan-
dard deviation in Table 4 and show that (a) the variation of
using 10 sample average in Table 2 is less ∼ 10% and (b)
the average PROVEN and improvement has less deviations
when we use 50 or 100 samples.
Model and Dataset. We use the publicly available pre-
trained models provided in [14] and [15] as classifier mod-
els, which are fully-connected feed-forward neural networks
with ReLU activation as well as general activations includ-
ing tanh, sigmoid and arctan on the MNIST [32] and CIFAR-
10 [33] datasets. We denote a network with m layers and n
neurons per layer as m× [n] in the Tables.
Implementation and Setup. We implement PROVEN1 in
Python and perform experiments on a laptop with 8 Intel
Cores i7-4700 HQ CPU at 2.40 GHz.
Result on small and large ReLU networks. We perform
simulations on both small 2-3 layer MNIST networks with
20 neurons per layer and large 2-7 layer MNIST and CI-
FAR networks with 1024 or 2048 neurons per layer; the
results are summarized in Tables 2a and 2b. These results
show that on the small networks, PROVEN can certify up
to 78.9% more with respect to the certified lower bound at
the expense of decreasing the confidence by only η = 10−2.
1https://github.com/lilyweng/PROVEN
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In other words, PROVEN guarantees that at least 99.99% of
the  computed (e.g., 0.04394 in MNIST 2×[20], Table 2a)
is a certified lower bound as compared to 0.02722 for the
worst-case delivered by Fast-Lin[14], where the improvement
we obtained for this model is 61.4%. Tables 2a and 2b are
both ReLU activations and the only difference is the bound-
ing techniques applied on the ReLU activations, where the
bounding technique in Table 2b is adaptive and thus can
certify more [15]. For large networks, PROVEN can certify
up to 76%, which is significant. Interestingly, when the
bounding technique is better, it also helps our probabilistic
bounds – the improvement is significant, and even for the
large CIFAR network with around 10,000 neurons, we can
still obtain 10− 15% improvement. For the cases where the
input perturbations are Gaussians, the results are presented
in Figure 1.
Results on large networks with general activations. We
also ran experiments on various MNIST and CIFAR net-
works with non-ReLU activations, e.g., tanh, sigmoid and
arctan. The results are summarized in Tables 2c to 2e. In
comparison to the same architecture but with ReLU ac-
tivations, the improvement of these activations are better
than the non-adaptive bounding technique in general, and
can achieve up to 32.8% on large networks. Note that the
computational overhead of our approach compared to the
worst-case analysis [14, 15] is very little, as we only need
to perform a few binary searches on the  that will satisfy
Corollary 3.2.
5 Conclusions and future works
We proposed a novel probabilistic framework PROVEN to
certify the robustness of neural networks and derived theo-
retical bounds on the robustness certification with statistical
guarantees. PROVEN is a general tool that can build on
top of existing state-of-the-art neural network robustness
certification algorithms (Fast-Lin, CROWN and CNN-Cert)
and hence can be readily applied to certify fully-connected
and convolutional neural networks with different activation
functions. Experimental results on large neural networks
demonstrated significant benefits of PROVEN over the stan-
dard worst-case analysis results.
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Table 2: The largest  that PROVEN can certify with confidence of at least γL = {99.99, 75, 50, 25, 5}% when Xi are
independent random variables in Case (i). We compare the largest  that PROVEN can certify with 99.99% with the largest 
from state-of-the-art worst-case robustness certification algorithms [14, 15] and show in the last column that PROVEN can
certify more than the worst-case analysis by giving up 0.01% confidence.
(a) Relu activation
Certification Method Worst-case [14] Our probabilistic approach: PROVEN Certification
Guarantees γL 100%† 99.99%† 75% 50% 25% 5% improvement†
MNIST 2×[20] 0.02722 0.04394 0.04782 0.04824 0.04859 0.04897 61.4%
MNIST 3×[20] 0.02127 0.02694 0.02831 0.02847 0.02860 0.02874 26.7%
MNIST 2×[1024] 0.02904 0.03572 0.03758 0.03778 0.03796 0.03814 23.0%
MNIST 3×[1024] 0.02082 0.02253 0.02303 0.02309 0.02313 0.02318 8.2 %
MNIST 4×[1024] 0.00796 0.00813 0.00817 0.00818 0.00818 0.00818 2.1 %
CIFAR 5×[2048] 0.00183 0.00186 0.00186 0.00186 0.00186 0.00186 1.6 %
CIFAR 7×[1024] 0.00189 0.00192 0.00192 0.00193 0.00193 0.00193 1.6 %
(b) Relu activation with adaptive bounds
Certification Method Worst-case [15] Our probabilistic approach: PROVEN Certification
Guarantees 100%† 99.99%† 75% 50% 25% 5% improvement†
MNIST 2×[20] 0.02746 0.04912 0.05212 0.05246 0.05276 0.05307 78.9 %
MNIST 3×[20] 0.02236 0.03828 0.03966 0.03981 0.03995 0.04009 71.2 %
MNIST 2×[1024] 0.03158 0.05560 0.05756 0.05779 0.05798 0.05818 76.1 %
MNIST 3×[1024] 0.02397 0.03524 0.03583 0.03589 0.03595 0.03601 47.1 %
MNIST 4×[1024] 0.00962 0.01288 0.01293 0.01294 0.01295 0.01295 33.9 %
CIFAR 5×[2048] 0.00228 0.00264 0.00265 0.00265 0.00265 0.00265 15.8 %
CIFAR 7×[1024] 0.00189 0.00209 0.00210 0.00210 0.00210 0.00210 10.6 %
(c) Tanh activation
Certification Method Worst-case [15] Our probabilistic approach: PROVEN Certification
Guarantees 100%† 99.99%† 75% 50% 25% 5% improvement†
MNIST 2×[1024] 0.02232 0.02915 0.03005 0.03013 0.03022 0.03033 30.6%
MNIST 3×[1024] 0.01121 0.01360 0.01376 0.01378 0.01380 0.01381 21.3 %
MNIST 4×[1024] 0.00682 0.00745 0.00750 0.00750 0.00751 0.00751 9.2 %
CIFAR 5×[2048] 0.00081 0.00085 0.00085 0.00085 0.00085 0.00085 4.9 %
(d) Sigmoid activation
Certification Method Worst-case [15] Our probabilistic approach: PROVEN Certification
Guarantees 100%† 99.99%† 75% 50% 25% 5% improvement†
MNIST 2×[1024] 0.02785 0.03285 0.03404 0.03419 0.03426 0.03441 18.0%
MNIST 3×[1024] 0.01856 0.02296 0.02342 0.02348 0.02353 0.02358 23.7 %
MNIST 4×[1024] 0.01778 0.02170 0.02224 0.02229 0.02232 0.02237 22.1 %
(e) Arctan activation
Certification Method Worst-case [15] Our probabilistic approach: PROVEN Certification
Guarantees 100%† 99.99%† 75% 50% 25% 5% improvement†
MNIST 2×[1024] 0.02105 0.02796 0.02907 0.02915 0.02924 0.02936 32.8%
MNIST 3×[1024] 0.01250 0.01462 0.01486 0.01488 0.01490 0.01493 17.0 %
MNIST 4×[1024] 0.00726 0.00829 0.00836 0.00837 0.00838 0.00838 14.2 %
CIFAR 5×[2048] 0.00078 0.00089 0.00089 0.00089 0.00089 0.00089 14.1 %
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Figure 1: We plot the improvement of the largest  certified by PROVEN with various confidence (γL =
{99.99, 75, 50, 25, 5}%) over the largest  certified by worst-case robustness certification algorithms [14, 15]. We consider
both input perturbations being independent/correlated Gaussian random variables as in Case (ii) and indedepent random
variables as in Case (i). The x-axis label in the figure: γL; y-axis label: Certification improvement of PROVEN over
worst-case. The models are 2-4 layers MNIST networks with 1024 nodes per layer and ReLU actiavations.
(a) Case (ii) Gaussian i.i.d. (b) Case (ii) Positive correlated Gaussian
(c) Case (ii) General correlated Gaussian (d) Case (i) Bounded independent inputs
Table 3: Summary of the improvement of our approach (we certify the bound with at least 99.99% confidence) compared to
worst-case [15].
model Relu Relu-ada tanh sigmoid arctan
MNIST 2×[1024] 23.0% 76.1% 30.6% 18.0% 32.8%
MNIST 3×[1024] 8.2% 47.1% 21.3% 23.7% 17.0%
MNIST 4×[1024] 2.1% 33.9% 9.2% 22.1% 14.2%
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Table 4: With input perturbations being independent random variables in case (i), we randomly choose {10, 50, 100}
input samples (images) in each trial and then compute the average of the largest  that can be certified by worst-case
analysis [15] (denoted as worst-case) and by PROVEN with 99.99% confidence (denoted as PROVEN) together with the
improved certification of PROVEN over worst-case (denoted as Improv.). We present the mean and std of the average  and
the improvements for {10, 50, 100} samples in a total of 100 random trials, showing that the mean and std converge as the
number of samples increases.
(a) MNIST 3×[1024], ReLU activation with adaptive bounds
100 rand trials 10 samples 50 samples 100 samples
worst-case PROVEN Improv. worst-case PROVEN Improv. worst-case PROVEN Improv.
Mean 0.02559 0.03703 44.75% 0.02581 0.03734 44.70% 0.02579 0.03733 44.74%
std 0.00165 0.00222 1.12% 0.00076 0.00102 0.57% 0.00054 0.00071 0.43%
(b) MNIST 3×[1024], tanh activation
100 rand trials 10 samples 50 samples 100 samples
worst-case PROVEN Improv. worst-case PROVEN Improv. worst-case PROVEN Improv.
Mean 0.01195 0.01375 15.17% 0.01193 0.01374 15.22% 0.01192 0.01374 15.25%
std 0.00065 0.00068 2.66% 0.00030 0.00030 1.27% 0.00020 0.00021 0.77%
(c) MNIST 4×[1024], ReLU activation with adaptive bounds
100 rand trials 10 samples 50 samples 100 samples
worst-case PROVEN Improv. worst-case PROVEN Improv. worst-case PROVEN Improv.
Mean 0.00998 0.01329 33.18% 0.00994 0.01325 33.24% 0.00997 0.01328 33.21%
std 0.00051 0.00066 0.57% 0.00021 0.00027 0.27% 0.00014 0.00018 0.15%
(d) MNIST 3×[1024], tanh activation
100 rand trials 10 samples 50 samples 100 samples
worst-case PROVEN Improv. worst-case PROVEN Improv. worst-case PROVEN Improv.
Mean 0.01195 0.01375 15.17% 0.01193 0.01374 15.22% 0.01192 0.01374 15.25%
std 0.00065 0.00068 2.66% 0.00030 0.00030 1.27% 0.00020 0.00021 0.77%
(e) CIFAR 5×[2048], ReLU activation with adaptive bounds
100 rand trials 10 samples 50 samples 100 samples
worst-case PROVEN Improv. worst-case PROVEN Improv. worst-case PROVEN Improv.
Mean 0.00224 0.00264 18.07% 0.00222 0.00262 17.93% 0.00222 0.00263 18.06%
std 0.00020 0.00025 2.39% 0.00009 0.00011 1.12% 0.00005 0.00006 0.55%
(f) CIFAR 5×[2048], arctan activation
100 rand trials 10 samples 50 samples 100 samples
worst-case PROVEN Improv. worst-case PROVEN Improv. worst-case PROVEN Improv.
Mean 0.00091 0.00100 9.28% 0.00091 0.00100 9.32% 0.00092 0.00100 9.32%
std 0.00008 0.00009 3.17% 0.00003 0.00003 1.15% 0.00001 0.00002 0.56%
(g) CIFAR 7×[1024], ReLU activation with adaptive bound
100 rand trials 10 samples 50 samples 100 samples
worst-case PROVEN Improv. worst-case PROVEN Improv. worst-case PROVEN Improv.
Mean 0.00176 0.00195 10.68% 0.00174 0.00192 10.73% 0.00174 0.00193 10.70%
std 0.00018 0.00020 1.87% 0.00007 0.00008 0.75% 0.00003 0.00004 0.37%
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